That’s against EU regulation, as new cars must include an SOS assistance button. (Granted, many car manufacturers hide multiple SIM cards in their vehicles now. Or they use the existing SIM card for navigation, music, analytics, GBs of software updates … and emergency assistance.)

Fair, that’s technically a SIM, but as you yourself noted, it’s not the one used by the manufacturer.
Maybe I should phrase it another way:
“Dear manufacturer, I’d like my business relationship with you to end after the purchase of this car. I will contact you if I need anything else, be it navigation, music, analytics, or updates. You will not contact me.”

“I’d like the variant without a SIM card please.”
Don’t buy features you don’t want.

Well yes, that’s what I was saying. Are you saying a VW vendor will not only sell me a car without any non-mandated communication modules but also give me a better price for it because it amounts to the car having fewer features? That’s actually good news.

You can’t buy a car that had its model registration in the EU after 2019 in the EU that hasn’t a SIM Card installed as it is part of an EU legislation.

Since Spring Boot version 1.5 is over 7 years old, that’s unlikely to be the cause. Instead, someone must have explicitly enabled the heap dump endpoint in production without authentication.

That is the major configuration problem that got the data accesible

Let’s recap. We now have user profiles showing which cars people drive and tracking data that sometimes spans years. While this data collection is covered in the terms and conditions for product improvement analysis, Volkswagen says they track this data to understand battery lifecycles better. Still, the need for location data remains unclear. The terms and conditions state that GPS data is truncated, which would significantly reduce tracking capabilities if accuracy drops to around 10 kilometers. Audi and Škoda implemented this correctly—cars from their fleet had location data truncated to approximately 10-kilometer accuracy. However, the problem arose with VW and Seat vehicles, where location data remained precise down to 10 centimeters.

That is the first configuration problem, to collect this data in the first place and then to collect it down to this level of precision.

This remains with the major architectural problem.

They could access complete user profiles and location data by combining this data. The breach revealed:

Enrollment data for both electric and non-electric vehicles, including details like VIN, model, year, and user ID

User data, including name, email, phone, and in some cases, physical addresses and preferred dealerships

EV data: Mileage, battery temperature, battery status, charging status, and even warning light data

Tracking data only for electric cars: GPS coordinates of the vehicles’ locations recorded every time the engine was turned off

All this data is stored in one place. Leaving aside the discussion of whether this data should be collected in the first place, there would be a strong reason to separate the data supposedly collected for technical analysis from the data that identifies who owns the car. Of course in the case of location data down to 10cm accuracy that is a bit moot as you can get the home address easily from the location data.

Please let me know if there was something i missed regarding my assessment of two configuration problems and one architectural problem.